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Interpreting GATT Using the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties: A Method to Increase
the Legitimacy of the Dispute Settlement
System
Peter C. Maki
For most of its history, the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) dispute settlement system has advanced the
principles of settlement and negotiation to resolve disputes.
This is changing in light of the creation of the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) in 1994 and the new Understanding on Dis-
pute Settlement (DSU) agreed to by the GATT parties in 1994.
The WTO and the DSU instituted new procedures that increase
the power of the dispute settlement system to adjudicate dis-
putes by reference to rules, rather than leaving the disputing
parties to negotiate a result based on their relative economic or
political power. Because the rule-based system is new, the WTO
dispute settlement panels which rely on the system must inspire
confidence among WTO members by making wound decisions.
Increased confidence will encourage the contracting parties to
use the dispute settlement system itself instead of using unilat-
eral retaliatory actions. By having a legitimate, predictable
rule-based system, the WTO hopes to encourage participation in
its dispute settlement system, thereby leading to the increased
confidence of WTO members in the power of the negotiated tar-
iffs themselves.
This Note will examine the results of the Appellate Body
decision in European Communities-Custom Classifications of
Certain Computer Equipment ("Computer Equipment"). In Com-
puter Equipment, the issue turned on what method of treaty in-
terpretation a body used to interpret the GATT. This Note
argues that the conclusion of the Appellate Body in Computer
Equipment advances two principles. First, that the WTO is to
be considered a rule-based constitutional body, not a negotia-
tion-based contractual body. Second, that applying a clear and
predictable method of treaty interpretation, increases the legiti-
macy of a decision. Finally, this note argues that this method of
interpretation will increase the confidence of parties in getting
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predictable results from the dispute settlement system, and will
therefore increase the amount of negotiation for new tariff con-
cessions, leading to a reduction in tariffs.
I. GATT: THE EVOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM
A. HISTORY OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
The GATT1 was designed to promote the liberalization of
trade.2 To reach this goal, the parties to the treaty advocated
tariffs that were binding on the parties and an openness and
clarity in governmental trade policy to protect the value of the
tariffs.3 Originally, the International Trade Organization (ITO)
was to be the enforcing institution behind the GATT.4 The ITO's
purpose would have been to ensure that countries followed their
tariff bindings, and that they did not devalue them by erecting
any non-tariff barriers to trade.5 However, the ITO never came
into being,6 and the parties to the GATT were forced to develop a
loose, consensus-based, member-enforced dispute settlement
system. 7
For the first few years of the GATT's existence, the parties
settled disputes by negotiation and the consensus of the con-
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
2. See John H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of
International Economic Relations 33 (1989) (explaining the origins of GATT).
3. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL Eco-
NOMIC RELATIONS, 3d ed. 502 (1995) (noting that the philosophy of the GATT is
that protection should be transparent and only in the form of tariffs). The au-
thor also notes that the tariff bindings are then protected under the Article I
Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause, and the Article III National Treatment
clause.
4. See JACKSON supra note 2, at 32.
5. See id. Non-tariff barriers include maneuvers such as internal taxation
on foreign goods and changing a product's tariff classification to defeat the
value of the negotiated tariff.
6. See JACKSON supra note 2, at 34. One of the reasons the ITO failed was
mainly because the United States Senate felt that too much power would be in
the hands of other countries, at the expense of state sovereignty.
7. See id. at 37; see also Michael K. Young, Dispute Resolution in the Uru-
guay Round: Lawyers Triumph Over Diplomats, 29 INT'L LAw. 389, 392 (1995).
(Noting that the original dispute resolution was "nonlegalistic." He notes that
the working parties, which were developed to resolve disputes, were mostly con-
ciliatory and mediative. Id. at 393. The "working parties" main function was to
find a mutually acceptable solution rather than to impose a solution based on
their own considerations of the provisions of the GATT. Id.)
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tracting parties." Subsequently, they developed neutral third
party Panels to adjudicate disputes. 9 Following the original
GATT principle of clarity in international trade, the Panels
strictly applied the rules of the GATT in dispute settlements.' 0
However, the Panels had no process for enforcing their deci-
sions. 1 Losing countries could block adoption of the ruling and
then negotiate a settlement in their favor. 12 Since they could
prevail on the merits, but still not be sure of relief, many coun-
tries became dissatisfied with the GATT dispute settlement ar-
rangement.'3 In the late 1960's, the dispute settlement system
fell into disuse,' 4 followed by an increase of usage in the
1970's.15 Starting in 1980, the dispute settlement system
started transforming itself from a diplomatic body into a judicial
8. See JACKSON supra note 2, at 95. In the beginning of the GATT, dispute
settlement system disputes were settled at semi-annual meetings of the parties.
Id. Then "working parties," consisting of representatives of the disputing par-
ties, were used to settle disputes. Id. See also ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYS-
TEM 31 (1993). The author notes that the original goal of the GATT parties,
lower tariffs, was basically realized by the early 1960's. The disputes were not
complex and could be solved "as a matter of arithmetic." Id. at 31.
9. See JACKSON supra note 2, at 95.
10. See HUDEC supra note 8, at 266. The author notes that vague rules,
which allow government discretion, would leave such a large organization such
as the GATT parties in a shambles. The author notes the Superfund case and
the 337 case as examples of GATT Panels strictly applying the GATT itself. Id.
at 266. The reason the Panels decided to apply strict rules is so the rules could
provide clear guidance to other countries. Id. at 267.
11. See Cristoph T. Feddersen, Focusing on Substantive Law in Interna-
tional Economic Relations: The Public Morals of GATT's Article XX(a) and
'Conventional" Rules of Interpretation, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 75, 82 (1998)
(noting that the GATT lacked rules for the procedure of dispute settlement and
for enforcement of obligations).
12. See id.
13. See Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., The World Trade Organization: A New Legal
Order for World Trade?, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 349, 354 (1995) (noting that some
weaknesses included the fact that there was ambiguity about the power of the
contracting parties to make certain decisions, and overall problems with dis-
pute settlement); see also Ramon R, Gupta, Comment, Appellate Body Interpre-
tation of the WTO Agreement: A Critique in Light of Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages, 6 PAC. Rim L. & POL'Y J. 683, 689 (1997) (noting that a major pur-
pose of new dispute resolution system was to stop unilateral action by countries
who did not think the present system could help them gain relief).
14. See HUDEC supra note 8, at 31 (pointing out that no countries used the
dispute settlement system for a period of years in the late 1960's, with a slight
increase in the 1970's).
15. See id.
6MIN J GLOBAL TRADE
body with its authority based on legal obligation. 16 Member
countries accepted the dispute settlement system's increased
legal authority. 17 However, by the time of the Uruguay Round
of trade negotiations in 1994, there was a growing consensus
that the dispute settlement system should evolve even further
and have power to make decisive and binding rulings.' 8 The
parties desired a system in which the final outcome was less de-
pendant on power and diplomacy and more dependant on rules
and adjudication. 19
In 1994, after the Uruguay Round, the contracting parties
created the WT0 20 and agreed to the new Understanding on
Dispute Settlement (DSU). 21 The WTO was created to be an or-
ganizing and enforcing body similar to what the ITO was to have
been. 22 The DSU included numerous provisions to increase the
power of the dispute settlement system to enforce Panel rulings,
including automatic adoption of Panel decisions so that a losing
party could not block the adoption of the decisions. 23 Together,
16. See Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An
Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 4 (1999) (noting
the evolution of the GATT system).
17. See id.
18. See JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 16 (1990)
(noting that countries took advantage of the many loopholes and ambiguities in
the agreement). The author also explains that the dissatisfaction arose as the
disputes became more complex. Id. at 37. Early disputes had generally been
about tariff obligations and were easily negotiated. Id. at 36. However, as tar-
iffs were lowered countries began to use non-tariff barriers to trade, such as
internal quotas and subsidies. Id. at 37. Since these could be administered in a
subtle manner, the dispute settlement system was not effective against these
problems. Id.
19. See id. at 52-53 (arguing for a rule-oriented approach). But see Phillip
R. Trimble, International Trade and the "Rule of Law", 83 MICH. L. REV. 1016,
1026 (1985) (arguing that vague rules which lead to negotiation are better than
strictly enforced rules).
20. See Dillon supra note 13, at 372.
21. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, 33 I.L.M. 112 (1993) [hereinafter DSUI.
22. See Dillon supra note 13, at 361.
23. See generally Kim Rubenstein & Jenny Schultz, Bringing Law and Or-
der to International Trade: Administrative Law Principles and the GATTI WTO,
11 ST. JoHN'S J. LEGAL ComMENT. 271, 278 (1996). The changes included that
Panel decisions are now automatically binding unless the WTO members vote
against them. Previously, the decisions did not take effect until a consensus of
the members had voted to enforce them. Id. at 288. The old system allowed the
losing party to effectively block the adoption of Panel reports. Under the new
system that power is gone. Id. Another major change is that Panel reports, if
not adopted by the parties, were kept secret, now they are published unless
there is a consensus objection. Id. at 292. This leads to more transparency in
the decision-making process.
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the WTO and the DSU have led to a more adjudicative, rule-
based approach to dispute resolution.24 Commentators antici-
pate that under the WTO and the DSU, the system will become
more predictable and efficient,25 furthering the overall purpose
of the GATT, which is to lower barriers to trade.26
B. LEGITIMACY OF AN ADJUDICATiVE BODY
Although the DSU made the dispute settlement system pro-
cedurally stronger, a key factor in developing a rule-based adju-
dicative system is that the parties using it must have confidence
in the substantive decisions of the adjudicative body. 27 The
GATT parties have long treated adopted Panel reports as legally
binding, 28 and under the new DSU it is very difficult for a losing
party to stop the adoption of a report. However, if a harmed
party does not think a dispute settlement panel will deliver a
clear, rational, and predictable result, the party will forego dis-
pute settlement altogether and take unilateral action. 2 9
Another change is that it is easier for a complainant to set up a Panel,
while in the past it was easy for the other party to block it and drag out the
process. See Debra P Steger, The Significance of the World Trade Organization
for the Future of the Trading System, 88 AM. Soc'Y INT'L. L. PROC. 125, 130
(1994) (noting some of the changes to the system).
24. See Amelia Porges, The WTO and the New Dispute Settlement, 88 AM.
Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 131, 135 (1994) ("[tlhe procedures in the DSU focus dis-
putes more than ever before on rule compliance, and less on conciliation"); But
see Young, supra note 7, at 390 (noting that not all countries wanted the new
system, some preferred the old system of diplomacy and negotiation).
25. See id.
26. See generally ALAN H. SCHACHTER, INTERPRETATION OF AMBIGUOUS
DOCUMENTS By INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS 1 (1964) (noting the
key purpose of international organizations is to provide peace and stability. He
argues that this is best achieved by having a strong and independent adminis-
tration). See also Gupta supra note 13, at 700 (noting an analogy between the
purpose of the GATT, which was clarity in international trade, and the WTO
and DSU, which is clarity and openness in the dispute settlement system).
27. See Hudec supra note 16, at 11 (stating that the first question to be
asked when evaluating whether the new dispute settlement system will work is
"what kind of political will stands behind it"); see also JACKSON supra note 8, at
75 (arguing that without integrity and credibility, a legal system will have no
"moral force"); Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82
AM. J. INT'L L. 705, 705 (1988) ("The surprising thing about international law is
that nations ever obey its strictures or carry out its mandates.").
28. See John H. Jackson, Editorial Comment, The WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding-Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligation, 91 AM.
J. INTL L. 60 (1997).
29. See Young supra note 7, at 408. The author notes that people are more
likely to accept adverse political decisions if those decisions are made by polit-
ical institutions they consider legitimate. See also ILMAR TAMMELO, TREATY IN-
TERPRETATION AND PRACTICAL REASON: TowARDS A GENERAL THEORY OF LEGAL
MiNv. J GLoBAL TRADE
An important factor in developing legitimacy is the quality
of the institution's substantive actions. 30 This quality is based
on the consistency, clarity, coherence, and persuasiveness of its
decisions.31 Although there is no rule of stare decisis in the
WTO legal system, dispute settlement panels routinely follow
older decisions. Thus, many scholars feel that the WTO must
build up solid case law to provide parties with predictable gui-
dance. 32 However, the dispute settlement system's general
problem of providing parties with clear and rational reasons for
a decision is especially challenging in unstable areas of the law
such as treaty interpretation. 33
C. INTERPRETING TREATIES: THE BATTLE BETWEEN
TEXTUALISTS AND INTENTIONALISTS
Courts interpreting treaties generally use one of two meth-
ods of interpretation: a textualist approach or an intentionalist
approach. 34 Proponents of each method believe that their
method advances the most important values underlying treaty
law. 35 The textualist believes that treaties should be objectively
INTERPRETATION 4 (1967) (stating that states are discouraged from making
agreements and from allowing disputes to be settled by a third party when
there is an uncertainty as to which principles of interpretation apply); Gupta
supra note 13, at 701 (stating that Panels are mandated, in light of the purpose
of the WTO, to create more predictable rules).
30. See SCHACHTER supra note 26, at 409; Steven P. Croley & John H.
Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, and Deference to Na-
tional Governments, 90 AM. J. IN'r'L L. 193, 212 (1996) (noting that a "reason-
able, nuanced approach by WTO Panels" will help the credibility of the dispute
settlement system and lessen dangers of unilateral action by governments).
31. See SCHACHTER supra note 26, at 409; Porges supra note 24 at 136 (not-
ing that if Panel reports are to be considered as quasi-binding precedent, the
parties will demand that the reports be more formal and transparent); see also
JACKSON supra note 18, at 78 ("[Ilt may be more important to clarify and pro-
vide predictive guidance about the application of a rule than to see that a judg-
ment' be acceptable to either or both parties to the immediate dispute."); see
also Franck supra note 27, at 712 (noting that when a court develops a rule that
is coherent and clear, the rule will be seen as being more legitimate than a rule
that appears arbitrary).
32. See Gupta supra note 13, at 701.
33. See generally David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Inter-
pretation, 41 UCLA L. REv. 953, 954 (1994) (looking for a "method in the mad-
ness" of treaty interpretation). The author also notes that without a clear
doctrine, courts have been inconsistent and confusing. Id. at 1034.
34. See id. Another school of interpretation is the purposivist school. Id.
The purposivist looks for the purpose of the treaty and applies that in interpre-
tation. Id. Although technically different, for the purposes and scope of this
Note, purposivist will be considered analogous to intentionalist.
35. See id. at 955.
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clear to all the parties to them, and therefore the textualist will
find a meaning that is most objectively reasonable.3 6 The inten-
tionalist, on the other hand, believes that the actual subjective
expectations of the parties should be protected, and therefore,
the intentionalist will look for evidence of what each party
thought the words meant and which meaning captures the true
intent.3 7
Intentionalist treaty analysis, in which the most important
goal is to discover and enforce the parties' expectations,3 8 is
analogous to modem common law contract interpretation. 39
Modem contract law interpretation is based on the principle
that the most important value in is to protect a party's reason-
able expectations.4 0 The classical method of contract interpreta-
tion, on the other hand, preferred an objective approach,
emphasizing that contract law and enforcement should be pre-
dictable and clear.4 '
The key difference between the two approaches is that,
under the modem intentionalist approach, a contract term will
be construed against the party who knew (or should have
known) that the other party may give the term a contrary inter-
pretation.4 2 Conversely, under the textualist, objective ap-
proach, a court simply gives the term the meaning that is most
reasonable in light of the circumstances.4 3
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See generally MYREs S. McDOUGAL ET AL., THE INTERPRETATION OF
AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 90 (1967) (noting different values un-
derlying methods of treaty interpretation).
39. See JOHN D. CAMILLARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLo, CONTRACTS, 3D ED.
(1987).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 201(2).
Where the parties have attached different meanings to a promise or
agreement or a term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with the
meaning attached by one of them if at the time the agreement was
made
(a) that party did not know of any different meaning attached by
the other, and the other knew the meaning attached by the first
party; or
(b) that party had no reason to know of any different meaning at-
tached by the other, and the other had reason to know the mean-
ing attached by the first party.
Id.
43. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT CONTRACTS (1932). This was the first restate-
ment of contracts, and it did not contain the rule cited supra, at note 42, which
was developed by the reporter's of the second restatement.
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D. INTERPRETING TREATIES: THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF TREATIES
After World War II, countries around the world desired a
consistent and uniform law of treaties.44 This effort culminated
in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Con-
vention).45 Among numerous sections dealing with various as-
pects of treaty law,4 6 Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention
set out the rules an adjudicative body is to use when interpret-
ing a treaty.47 The interpretative articles were developed in
44. See Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
Before United States Courts, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 281, 289 (1988). Until the Vi-
enna Convention, rules dealing with the form, function, duration and scope of
treaties were based on custom. Id. The process of codifying international law
started in 1947 was finally completed in 1969. Id. at 290-91.
45. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (May 23, 1969), 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969). See generally, I. M. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON THE LAw OF TREATIES 12 (1973) (noting that the Vienna Con-
vention was partly a codification of existing international law, and also an at-
tempt at progressive modification of the existing customary law); Daniel N.
Hylton, Default Breakdown: The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties' In-
adequate Framework on Reservations, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 419, 424
(1994) (noting that the Vienna Convention was attempt to bring certainty to
international law).
46. Overall, the Convention deals with treaty issues such as entry into
force, termination, application, and so on.
47. Article 31
General Rule of Interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall
comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between
all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in con-
nexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other
parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the rela-
tions between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given a term if it is established that the
parties so intended.
Article 32
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part to end the dispute between the intentionalists and textual-
ists and to provide consistency in treaty interpretation by
courts.4 8 This consistency would then assist countries to better
predict the results of their actions, and permit them to plan with
more foresight.
The method used by the Vienna Convention is an organized
hierarchy of the standard canons of interpretation. Article 31
states that a court should start by looking for the ordinary
meaning of the words in light of the context, object, and purpose
of the agreement.49 The court is also to inquire into subsequent
agreements by the parties that may shed light on the mean-
ing.50 Only if the meaning is still unclear may the court then
inquire into the negotiating history of the agreement.5 '
Articles 31 and 32 were originally thought to be a victory for
the objective, textualist school of interpretation.5 2 Advocates of
the intentionalist method felt that the Vienna Convention
method did not give enough emphasis to the parties' intent.53
However, the Vienna Convention method has turned out to be
flexible, and courts have a fair amount of discretion when apply-
ing it. 4 A court that wants to follow intentionalist principles is
still able to justify itself by reference to the Vienna Conven-
Supplementary Means of Interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, in-
cluding the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its
conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the applica-
tion of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation
according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
48. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
§325 (1986). The Restatement follows the exact text of the Vienna Convention
§31. The reporter notes that its purpose is to make the law consistent.
49. Vienna Convention art. 31(a).
50. Id. art. 31(b).
51. Id. art. 32.
52. See MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL., THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS
AND WORLD PU3LIC ORDER 90 (1967) (arguing that Vienna Convention goes
against the accepted wisdom that the shared expectations of the parties is the
goal of treaty interpretation).
53. See Bederman supra note 33, at 954-955, 975 (noting that the Vienna
Convention focuses primarily on the text of the agreement); TAMMELO supra
note 29, at 19 (stating that the primary goal of the Vienna Convention is not to
search for the intention of the parties).
54. See Bederman supra note 33, at 975-76 (analyzing United State
Supreme Court decisions that have used the Vienna Convention and finding
them inconsistent).
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tion.5 5 One commentator notes that courts are able to use the
Vienna Convention method to inquire into the negotiating his-
tory in order to evaluate whether the textual meaning is clear in
the first place, and then proceed to apply the intentionalist
method.5 6 Other commentators have also justified using the Vi-
enna Convention method to advocate a variety of interpretative
techniques.5 7
E. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE GATT By PANELS
Since clarity and predictability are goals of the dispute set-
tlement system, WTO Panels have consistently said that the Vi-
enna Convention is the tool they use to interpret the GATT.58
Most commentators have focused on the need for the panels to
use the Vienna Convention in order to develop a body of inter-
pretative decisions that feature clear rules.5 9 The commenta-
tors believe that with clear, bright-line rules to guide them,
future panels will not have to do a case-by-case analysis. Fur-
thermore, the parties to a dispute will be able to predict the re-
sult of their actions, and will thus be able to plan accordingly. 60
55. See id.
56. See TsuNE-Cm Yu, THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES 28 (1927) (argu-
ing that artificial rules are not good, and that courts should develop rules for
each specific case).
57. Some have advocated that Panels should protect a state's sovereignty
and defer to a state's interpretation of the agreement if it is reasonable. See
James R. Cannon, Jr. & Karen L. Bland, GATT Panels Need Restraining Princi-
ples, 24 LAw & POL'Y INTL Bus. 1167, 1184 (1993). This rule is analogous to the
United State administrative agency deference rule developed in Chevron U.S.A.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding that if a
statute is ambiguous, then an agency's interpretation of it will only be reviewed
under a reasonableness standard). But see Steven P. Croley & John H. Jack-
son, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standards of Review, and Deference to National
Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 193, 213 (1996) (arguing against judicial re-
straint by Panels because it could lead to ambiguous rules).
Others have stated that the overriding principle is that each treaty is dif-
ferent and should be treated differently, and a court should look at the treaty's
formation and other factors and then decide which canon of interpretation is
most applicable. See TAMMELO supra note 29, at 49; see also Bederman supra
note 33, at 1034 (concluding that treaties are sui generis and that courts should
treat them as neither statutes nor contracts).
58. See e.g., Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties before the United States Court, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 281, 285 (1988) (not-
ing that even before the Convention entered into force, courts invoked its princi-
ples as codifying the existing law).
59. See Gupta supra note 13, at 685 (arguing that the there is a need for
predictability in international trade law, and that the Appellate Body's decision
in this case was inadequate to provide that predictability).
60. Id.
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Another need, which has not been addressed by commenta-
tors, is that the Appellate Body needs to put forward the appro-
priate method, whether intentionalist or textualist, for using the
Vienna Convention itself. This is important, because depending
on how a panel applies the Vienna Convention, a decision may
come out differently. In European Communities-Custom Clas-
sifications of Certain Computer Equipment ('Computer Equip-
ment"), the Appellate Body overturned the Panel's decision, and
in the process set out two clear rules. 61 First, they held that
when interpreting a country's tariff schedule, another party's le-
gitimate expectations had no relevance. Second, they held that
the Panel had misapplied the Vienna Convention, and that
panels need to apply the Vienna Convention itself clearly and
methodically. 62 This Note will analyze what the future impact
of the WTO Appellate Body decision in Computer Equipment
will be.
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COMPUTER
EQUIPMENT DISPUTE
A. ANALYSIS BY PANEL AND APPELLATE BODY
The Computer Equipment dispute arose when the United
States claimed that the European Community (EC) had violated
Article II of the GATT by charging a higher tariff for Local Area
Network (LAN) computer equipment than it was allowed to
under its bound tariff Schedule. 63 LAN's were not mentioned
specifically in the EC Schedule LXXX tariff bindings. However,
the United States claimed that LAN equipment should be classi-
fied under heading 84.17, as Automatic Data Processing (ADP)
equipment, while the EC countered that LAN equipment was
properly classified under heading 85.17 as telecommunications
equipment. The issue presented to the Panel by the parties was
whether the EC had violated Article 11.64 This ultimately
turned on the interpretation of the term "ADP."
The parties specifically stipulated that the Panel was not
required to find what the correct classification of LAN's should
be.65 Rather, the Panel was only required to find whether the
EC had violated their tariff binding by classifying LAN equip-
61. European Communities-Custom Classifications of Certain Computer
Equipment, WTO/DS68/AB/R (1998).
62. Id.
63. Id. 1 27.
64. Id. 1 1.
65. Id. ff 90.
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ment as telecommunications equipment rather than ADP equip-
ment. The Panel used the Vienna Convention to ascertain the
meaning of ADP. It first looked at the plain meaning of the word
and concluded that it could not be determined in isolation. It
then looked at the context of the word by looking at Schedule
LX, Article II of the GATT, and the GATT as a whole. From
these, the Panel did not extract the meaning of ADP. However,
it did conclude, in light of the context of Article II and the GATT
text, that a party's "legitimate expectations" should be pro-
tected. It then determined that to protect those expectations, a
party's reasonable understanding of the meaning of a term, cre-
ated during negotiations, was relevant in interpreting that
term.
Since the United Kingdom, negotiating on behalf of the EC,
had treated LAN equipment as ADP equipment during tariff ne-
gotiations, the Panel held that the U.S. had legitimate expecta-
tions in believing that is what the term meant.66 The Panel
also held that the importing country has the burden of clarifying
any ambiguities it has in its Schedules.6 7 These two factors led
the Panel to conclude that the U.S. was justified in believing
that LAN equipment should be classified as ADP equipment,
and that the U.K. had not rebutted that justification. The Panel
then concluded that the U.S.'s legitimate expectations should
determine the meaning of ADP in Schedule LXXX. 68
The Appellate Body overruled the Panel. It held that a sin-
gle party's "legitimate expectations" were irrelevant in deter-
mining the meaning of a treaty term.69 It also held that the
Panel erred in its use of the Vienna Convention by extracting
such a doctrine from the context of the GATT. The Appellate
Body noted that finding the common meaning of the word, not
just one party's interpretation, better serves the values of clarity
and predictability. 70 Since GATT is a multi-party document, al-
lowing a single party's meaning to override other parties' mean-
ings would not lead to clarity.7' The Appellate Body also
concluded that the Panel had erred in holding that the U.S. was
not required to clarify any ambiguities. 72 It held that all of the
66. Id. gr 76.
67. Id. 1 101.
68. Id.
69. Id. V 84.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. fV 110.
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disputing countries had the duty to clarify a term during
negotiations. 73
The Appellate Body then explained how the Panel should
have utilized the Vienna Convention.74 It emphasized that the
purpose of the Vienna Convention method is to find the common
meaning of a term, not one party's meaning. The Appellate
Body first applied Article 31 and noted that the meaning of ADP
was still ambiguous. 7 5 Next, it applied Article 32, which allows
a court to look at extrinsic information to determine the mean-
ing of a word. The Appellate Body noted that different countries
had treated LAN equipment differently, which showed that
there was not an accepted meaning of the term.7 6 It also noted
that the U.S. had treated LAN equipment as telecommunica-
tions equipment prior to 1992. Additionally, it also noted that
the Harmonized System7 7 would be valuable in determining the
meaning of a term.78 The Appellate Body found all of these fac-
tors, which the Panel had ignored because they were not rele-
vant to the U.S.'s expectations, to be significant in determining
the meaning of the term ADP.79
B. THE PANEL USED THE VIENNA CONVENTION To INTERPRET
THE GATT LIKE A CONTRACT BETWEEN Two PARTIES
The Panel's result is analogous to what would occur under
modem contract law analysis. Under the modern law, as set out
in the Second Restatement of Contracts, when two parties disa-
gree on the meaning of a term, the term is construed against the
party who knew (or should have known) that the other party
might give it another meaning.8 0 This view advances the over-
riding principle of modem contract interpretation, which is to
enforce the intent of the parties.8 1 This, in turn, leads to greater
73. Id.
74. Id. 1185.
75. Id. 1186.
76. Id. 1 92.
77. The Harmonized System is a tariff classification system that most WTO
members adhere to so that tariff classifications are consistent from country to
country. The Panel had not referred to it because the parties had specifically
stated that the issue was not where LAN equipment should be classified, but
rather whether the UK had broken its tariff binding. The U.S. probably
thought they would lose if the issue was the proper classification of LAN equip-
ment, so they tried to make it out to be a case of misrepresentation by the U.K.
78. Id. Y1 89.
79. Id. 11 98.
80. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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confidence in contracts in general, which courts feel is good for
the economy.8 2 The Panel held that since the U.K. knew or
should have known that the U.S. would think LAN's were
ADP's, the burden of clarifying the term was on the U.K. Appar-
ently, the Panel felt that by enforcing the deal, they could in-
crease reliance on negotiation, which would lead to an overall
reduction in tariffs.83
This would be a logical result except, as the Appellate Body
noted, the U.S. and the U.K. are not the only parties bound by
the GATT. Since, under the Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause,
all countries receive the benefit of the bound tariff,8 4 it is impor-
tant to define the term by reference to all of them. Treating a
term in a multi-lateral treaty by the definition misrepresented
by one party to another party would lead to increasing ambigu-
ity and disuse of the dispute settlement system. 5 This is be-
cause every negotiated term in the treaty would only mean what
the exporter thought it meant. The result would be chaos.
C. THE APPELLATE BODY USED THE VIENNA C01VW"IOW TO
INTERPRET THE GATT LIKE A CONSTITUTION OR
STATUTE
The Appellate Body's interpretation was analogous to the
modern textualist approach to statutory interpretation. The Ap-
pellate Body appeared to follow the philosophy of the textualists
by holding that the subjective interpretations of one of the par-
ties is simply not relevant to the meaning of the term.8 6 In the
statutory context, textualist courts have held that it is not rele-
vant what the drafter of a statute thought it meant. Since
courts apply the statute to the general public, it is only impor-
tant to discover what the words mean.8 7 GATT tariff Schedules
are different from statutes because tariff Schedules are formed
as if the parties were negotiating a contract. However, because
of the MFN clause, the Schedules actually do apply to all mem-
bers.s8 Therefore, it is important that all members know what
the term means. The values that the statutory textualists are
attempting to advance are a common understanding of the text
82. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
87. Id.
88. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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by an average person.8 9 This is the same value that the Appel-
late Body is advancing in Computer Equipment. The Appellate
Body interprets the common meaning of the word.
D. THE OVERALL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PANEL AND
APPELLATE BODY METHODS
In Computer Equipment, the Appellate Body rejected an ap-
proach that would inquire into a single party's subjective inter-
pretation of a term and instead mandated a clear, objective
method to determine meaning of the term "ADP." The Appellate
Body methodically and clearly applied Vienna Convention Arti-
cles 31 and 32. The Panel, on the other hand, discarded the Vi-
enna Convention method after determining that it was
impossible to decipher the definition purely on the ordinary
meaning of the words. The Appellate Body's rule of strictly fol-
lowing the Vienna Convention method is clearer than the Panel's
rule. If future panels followed the Computer Equipment Panel,
they would be able to develop arbitrary rules that fit the facts of
the case.90 The Appellate Body held that panels should not do
that; rather they should strictly follow the Vienna Convention
method.
Another difference between the Panel interpretation and
the Appellate Body was use of the Harmonized System. The
Panel did not even refer to the Harmonized System because it
felt it would have no bearing on what the U.S. thought ADP
meant while negotiating Schedule LXXX. The Appellate Body,
on the other hand, felt that the Harmonized System's definition
of LAN was relevant to the meaning of the term.9 1 In deciding
this, the Appellate Body again emphasized that the terms are to
be defined from a third-person objective viewpoint. 92 The Appel-
late Body noted that since the GATT has an MFN clause, 93 other
parties have to know the meanings of its terms, not just the par-
ties who negotiated it. Therefore, the Appellate Body decided
that even if the dispute was only between two countries, the def-
inition of a term is to be ascertained from beyond their view-
89. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
93. Article I of the GATT provides that countries have to afford every other
country at least as favorable treatment as the treatment they give to the most
favored nation.
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points.94 In terms of interpretation, this means that panels
need to investigate how third parties treated the term.
The Appellate Body also differed from the Panel on the rele-
vance of how third-party countries defined LANs. The Panel
had noted that the various countries in the EC had been incon-
sistent in their treatment of LAN equipment. However, Ireland
and the U. K. had treated LAN's as ADP's during the relevant
time period. The Appellate Body held that it was relevant that
the EC had been inconsistent. The Appellate Body reasoned
that inconsistency was proof that the term was undefined, and
therefore, that the U.S. had no reason to believe that it would be
defined a certain way in the future.
Future disputes will be more easily resolved by reference to
the Appellate Body's decision. The parties will have a more sta-
ble basis to analyze their own actions and predict the results
that will occur.95 Parties will then be more apt to follow the
rules and there will be increased respect for the tariff bindings
as negotiated.96
E. THE VALUES ADVANCED BY THE DIFFERENT METHODS
The Panel Report came up with a fair and reasonable result.
The evidence tended to show that the U.K did give the U.S. rea-
son to believe that LAN's would be treated as ADP's. The Appel-
late Body might even have allowed this result if the Panel had
not created the "legitimate expectations" rule of interpretation.
If the Panel had simply gone through the Vienna Convention
analysis without any side analysis, the Appellate Body would
probably not have reviewed the decision so closely.
The Appellate Body had two main grounds of contention
with the Panel's analysis. First, the Body did not want the
Panel to use the Vienna Convention analysis to extract a new
rule of interpretation. The Appellate Body held that the Vienna
Convention rules, in themselves, are sufficient to ascertain the
meanings of the GATT. Second, the Appellate Body held that
even if a panel was allowed to extract new rules, the Panel in
this case had extracted the wrong one. The Appellate Body con-
cluded that the purpose of the GATT tariff bindings is not to
protect legitimate expectations, but to provide clarity and pre-
dictability in international trade.
94. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
95. Id.
96. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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By using objective analysis, the Appellate Body solidified
the evolving position of the GATT as a constitutional or statu-
tory type document instead of a contractual one. Although there
is still contention among courts and commentators, the trend is
that courts interpret the average statute objectively. 9 7 More-
over, in contract law, the change from the classical objective
analysis to the modern subjective approach is almost total, as
witnessed by the change from the First Restatement of Con-
tracts to the Second Restatement. 98
Treating the GATT as a constitution or statutory document
instead of a contract is significant because it turns the GATT/
WTO from a negotiating forum into a rules-based adjudicative
system.9 9 In a system where disputes are settled by reference to
the relative power of the parties, any rules underlying the dis-
pute are meaningless.1 0 0 The parties will only acknowledge the
rules when they agree with them. However, when the dispute is
settled by reference to the rules themselves, parties must then
confront these rules and agree to be bound by them. This re-
spect for rules automatically leads to more confident negotiat-
ing, especially by weaker parties. It was important for GATT/
WTO to make the transition, otherwise the powerful members
would have mandated what the agreement meant.10 1
The other result of the Appellate Body's method of interpre-
tation is not addressed in their report, though it does flow from
it. In a legal system, when a court's opinions are reasonable and
clear, members of the community are naturally more confident
in the system and more apt to use it. 10 2 This is especially true in
the WTO because there is nothing else binding the members to
obey the decisions of the panels.' 0 3 The opinion in Computer
Equipment sets forth exactly how the Appellate Body wants fu-
ture panels to use the Vienna Convention. The Appellate Body
wants the Vienna Convention to be followed methodically, and
they do not want panels to go off on tangents and extract doc-
trines from the text and apply them. The Appellate Body em-
phasized its displeasure with the way the Panel in this case
developed the doctrine of legitimate expectations and then ap-
plied it with only token regard to the Vienna Convention. The
97. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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Panel had quickly decided that the meaning was unascertaina-
ble without reference to the U.S.'s legitimate expectations.
Since the Vienna Convention method is flexible,' 04 it is impor-
tant that the Appellate Body laid down specific guidelines that
disputing parties can refer to when they want to calculate their
liabilities during a dispute. The predictability a clear rule gives
is valuable in a multi-party agreement like the GATT.
CONCLUSION
The Appellate Body in Computer Equipment advanced the
evolution of the GATT/WTO organization from a negotiating
body into a constitutional body. The Appellate Body accom-
plished this in two ways. First, by interpreting the GATT and
tariff Schedules using objective methods instead of subjective
methods, the Appellate Body promoted the clarity of the Agree-
ment and the Schedules at the expense of the intent of the par-
ties. This is the most common way to interpret a rule-based
agreement such as a constitution. Second, by using a clear, ob-
jective method they should also increase the confidence of the
WTO members in the dispute settlement system as an adjudica-
tive body instead of a negotiating body. Both of these factors
mean that the WTO will be considered a rule-base, adjudicative
organization. The WTO members hope this will advance the
overall purpose of the GATT/WTO, which is to lower the barriers
to international trade.
104. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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